Introduction
The turmoil in financial markets in late 1998 accompanied a sharp decrease in market liquidity. Some financial institutions faced unexpectedly high bid-ask spreads when liquidating positions. This paper is an analysis of the effect on key risk measures (such as the likelihood of insolvency, value at risk, and expected tail loss) of bid-ask spreads that are likely to widen just when positions must be liquidated in order to maintain capital ratios, thus triggering additional losses. Our results show that illiquidity causes significant increases in risk measures, especially if spreads are negatively correlated with asset returns.
A potential strategy is to liquidate illiquid assets earlier, keeping a cushion of cash or liquid assets for "rainy days." Our results show that, although this approach is usually effective, it tends to increase expected trading costs, and may fail when asset returns and bid-ask spreads have fat tails.
motions. The mid-price at time t of the liquid asset is S 1,t = S 1,0 exp (µ 1 t + σ 1 B 1,t ) , while the mid-price of the illiquid asset at time t is S 2,t = S 2,0 exp µ 2 t + σ 2 ρB 1,t + 1 − ρ 2 B 2,t , where B 1 , B 2 , B 3 , . . . are independent standard Brownian motions; µ i and σ i determine the instantaneous expected return and volatility of the mid-price S i ; and ρ is the instantaneous correlation between the mid-price increments of the liquid and illiquid asset.
Let X i,t denote the (relative) mid-to-bid spread at time t on asset i. That is, the bid price for the liquid asset is S 1,t (1 − X 1,t ) and the bid price for the illiquid asset is S 2,t (1 − X 2,t ). We assume that X 1,t = X 1,0 exp γ 1 ρ 1 B 1,t + 1 − ρ where γ i denotes the volatility of the relative bid-ask spread on asset i and ρ i determines the correlation between the mid-price increment of asset i and the change in the spread on asset i. With ρ i < 0, spreads are expected to widen as prices fall. (This parameterization admits the possibility of negative bid prices, but at typical parameters the likelihood of this over short horizons is negligible.)
This formulation implies no time trend in spreads, nor correlation between spreads across different assets beyond that induced by mid-price movements. Reflecting the idea that asset 1 is more liquid than asset 2, we set initial spread values such that X 2,0 > X 1,0 > 0.
example through an infusion of new equity, is not feasible during the short time horizons that we consider.) Let λ i,t denote the number of units of asset i liquidated in period t. We suppose (until later analysis) that the firm liquidates cash first, then the liquid asset, and finally the illiquid asset. Details of the liquidation algorithm are provided in the Appendix. Once this process is completed, the holdings of the three asset types at the end of the period are recorded and carried over to the next period by setting, for each asset type i,
We assume that liabilities earn the fixed short rate r. (As the liabilities are apparently not default free, we could assign a higher borrowing rate R > r, but over short time horizons the effect of this would be similar for typical parameters.) Taking the proceeds from asset sales in period t into account, the value of the liabilities in period t + 1 is
The above asset liquidation process is repeated for ten successive trading days. At the end of the tenth day, the terminal capital, K 10 , is computed based on current asset holdings and liabilities. The 99%-VaR is the 99% critical value of the distribution of cumulative losses in capital K 0 − K 10 , over the ten-day period. Expected tail loss (ETL) is the expected loss in capital conditional on the event that losses exceed the 99%-VaR. The probability of insolvency is the probability that the firm's capital is eliminated within the 10-day period. It has been noted that VaR is not a coherent risk measure in the sense of Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999) . The expected tail loss, however, is coherent and, although not as commonly reported, is preferred conceptually as a risk measure. The use of a 99% confidence level, rather than some other quantile, is arbitrary but conventional.
Basic Results
This section presents the results of our Monte-Carlo analysis, based on 25,000 pseudo-independent ten-day scenarios for each case. Unless otherwise specified, the (annualized) base-case parameters are r = 0.05, µ 1 = 0.1, µ 2 = 0.2, σ 1 = σ 2 = 0.2, γ 1 = γ 2 = 1 and ρ = −0.5. In order to highlight the effect of liquidity, we have equated the volatility of the assets. We take the target capital ratio c r to be the typical regulatory ratio of 8%, and assume an initial asset structure of α 0 = 2, α 1 = 8, α 2 = 90, with an initial capital ratio of 9%, implying initial liabilities of L 0 = 91. In other words, at time 0, the firm exceeds its regulatory capital requirements by 1%, and holds 90% of its assets in illiquid form.
We study four cases, based on alternative starting values for the mid-bid spread. The base case has no spread. The other three cases assume initial spreads, for the liquid and illiquid assets, respectively, of 0.1% and 0.5%, 0.2% and 1%, and 0.5% and 2.5%. As a point of comparison, Schultz (2001) estimates rount-trip trading costs for corporate bond trades by institutional investors with dealers of approximately 0.27%, indicating tighter spreads than most of our cases. On the other hand, our initial conditions are designed to place the portfolio, in terms of leverage and spreads, in a relatively "distressed" state, given which a seller might anticipate predatory or conservative quotes.
For each case, we analyze four settings, based on the variability of spreads and the degree of correlation between spreads and prices: (1) constant spreads, (2) random spreads that are uncorrelated with asset returns, (3) random spreads moderately negatively correlated with returns, with ρ 1 = ρ 2 = −0.5, and (4) random spreads highly negatively correlated with returns (ρ 1 = ρ 2 = −0.8). The resulting 99%-VaR, expected tail loss (ETL), and probability of insolvency results for our 10-day period are reported in Table 1 . The VaR and expected tail losses show only moderate responses to changes in the degree of illiquidity. Figure 1 compares 10-day insolvency probabilities for the case of large initial mid-bid spreads of 50 and 250 basis points for the relatively liquid and illquid assets, respectively. Also shown is the most adverse of these cases (for large negative spread-return correlation), with a reversal of the order of liquidation, selling least-liquid assets first. Further discussion of liquidation strategy follows in Section 6. Ten-day insolvency probabilities, normal returns, 20% return volatility, 0.5% and 2.5% initial spreads, zero or 100% spread volatility, various spread-return correlations, and cash-first liquidation except as noted. Estimates based on 200,000 trials.
It has been widely documented in the literature that asset returns, especially in the short run, are fat tailed. In order to investigate the effect of non-normality on the relevance of spreads for liquidation risk, Table 2 presents the results of similar computations when jumps in prices are allowed. To model jumps in prices, we replaced the normal distribution of the daily increment of each Brownian motion B i with a mixed normal distribution, with a daily "jump" probability of 0.02 and a kurtosis 1 of 10. The VaR and ETL results are significantly larger. The pattern of results is similar to that in Table 1 , with correlation between returns and spreads leading to an increase in VaR and ETL of above 7%. Increasing the degree of negative correlation between returns and spreads leads to a sharp increase in the probability of insolvency of more than 40%, from 0.84% to 1.21%.
High Price Volatility
How does the effect of the bid-ask spread on liquidation risk depend on asset price volatility? Intuitively, increasing volatility should lead to more frequent asset sales and therefore to larger spread-induced losses. In order to investigate this issue, we ran additional simulations using an asset price volatility of 40% (σ i = 0.4). The results for normal returns, reported in Table  3 , show that increasing price volatility leads to a sizable increase in all risk measures, and especially in the probability of insolvency. Although the pattern of results is similar to that in the 20% volatility case of Section 3, it is worth noting that the effect of spreads on liquidation risk is weaker. For small spreads, the increases in VaR and ETL are now only about 1.5%, versus 3% in the base case. Large spreads bring increases of about 10% in these measures, half of the value obtained in Section 3. Moreover, while negative correlation between spreads and returns still leads to an increase in VaR and ETL, this effect is weaker than with low volatility.
These results are driven by early asset sales. When volatility is high, the institution must liquidate assets in greater amounts, and sooner, in order to meet capital requirements. This is similar to the effect of a "stop-loss" strategy for sales. As more assets are sold, the institution's exposure to price fluctuations falls. As a result, VaR rises by less than the increase in asset price volatility would imply. As spreads are introduced, even more assets must be sold in order to meet the capital requirements. The reduction in exposure thus mitigates the increase in VaR caused by larger spreads. The insolvency probability is sensitive, however, to the presence of spreads in the high-volatility case, increasing from 0.14% in the no-spread case to 2.67% for large spreads. With a strong negative correlation between spreads and returns, the insolvency probablity rises further to almost 5%.
As can be seen in Table 4 , similar effects come into play with fat tails.
In summary, higher volatility actually reduces the relative impact of spreads on VaR and expected tail loss, but increases their relative effect on the insolvency probability.
1 To simulate a random variable of zero mean and unit variance with fat tails (excess kurtosis), we proceed as follows. Let Y be the outcome of a Bernouilli trial that takes the value 1 with probability p and the value 0 with probability 1 − p. Let Z denote a standard normal random variable. Then, the random variable X = αY + 1−pα 2 1−p (1 − Y ) Z has zero mean, unit variance and a kurtosis of 5 High Spread Volatility Table 5 reports the effect of spreads on risk measures in a setting of substantial spread volatility of 200% (γ i = 2), with a return volatility of 40% (σ i = 0.4). At our base-case correlation of −0.5 between returns and spreads, for example, this means that spreads would widen in expectation from 50 basis points to approximately 2 250 basis points given a sudden reduction in price of 1%.
The percentage increase in VaR caused by spreads is comparable to that in the high-volatility case, whereas the additional percentage increase in VaR caused by correlation between spreads and prices is comparable to that in the base case. For example, large spreads lead to an increase in VaR of about 10% (the value reported in Section 4), while correlation leads to an additional increase of almost 6% (the value reported in Section 3).
While a similar pattern of dependence emerges for ETL, the effect of price and spread volatility compounds for the probability of insolvency. Both the percentage increase due to spreads and the increase due to correlation are substantially higher here than in Section 4.
Cash-Last Liquidation Strategy
We have thus far assumed that the institution liquidates cash first. Only when cash is exhausted does the firm sell its liquid asset position. Coming last in the pecking order, illiquid assets are sold only in extreme cases.
This cash-first liquidation strategy raises the concern that, in the most stressful situations, the institution may have only illiquid assets left to sell. An alternative liquidation strategy is to sell illiquid assets first, keeping a "cushion" of cash and liquid assets for "rainy days." This section analyzes the effects of this strategy on VaR, ETL, and insolvency probability. We first consider the low volatility case (σ i = 0.2) from Section 3. The results of the simulations for the four spread scenarios are summarized in Table 6 . The picture that emerges from these calculations is similar to that of Section 3. Both the sizes of spreads and their correlation with asset returns have a significant impact on VaR and ETL.
Both VaR and ETL are significantly smaller than for the cash-first liquidation strategy. This improvement is accompanied, however, by higher transactions costs. Table 7 contrasts the expected transactions costs for the "cash-first" and "cash-last" liquidation strategies. The cash-last strategy is expected to cost approximately 40% more.
The results of similar computations for the case of fat tails are summarized in Table 8 . VaR, ETL, and the probability of insolvency are significantly smaller than in the case in which cash is liquidated first. The percentage decrease is strongest for the probability of insolvency, which falls by almost 20% in the case of large spreads.
Consider, for example, the comparison offered in the high-volatility case between the cashfirst and cash-last liquidation strategies, with moderately large spreads (0.2% and 1% mid-to-bid relative prices) and moderately large correlation (ρ i = −0.5). The cash-last strategy increases expected liquidation costs by 5 basis points of assets (0.349−0.299 per initial 100 in assets, from Table 10), and reduces the probability of insolvency by 41 basis points (0.62% − 0.21%, from Tables 3 and 9 ). This implies a break-even financial insolvency distress cost of approximately 0.12 basis points of assets, or roughly 1 basis point of initial capital. That is, if the event of insolvency is expected to cost more than 1 basis point of the market value of the portfolio (for example, in terms of franchise value and re-organization fees), then the cash-last strategy is more effective than the cash-first strategy, for this particular case. Obviously, the breakeven point of insolvency distress costs depends heavily on the particular regime of volatilities, correlations, and spreads.
Our results suggest an important trade-off between the goals of minimizing expected transaction costs during stressed asset sales and the goal of reducing the probability of insolvency (with the associated costs of overall financial distress).
Conclusion
Using a simple model, we analyzed the effect of spreads and their variability on various measures of liquidation risk. If spreads are expected to increase as prices fall, then the effect of market liquidity on liquidation risk can be dramatic, especially with fat-tailed returns. We have not treated the case of "price impact," under which the act of selling itself lowers bid prices, which could be critical if the asset holdings are large relative to the market.
With a goal of minimizing expected transaction costs, cash and liquid assets would be sold first. This liquidation strategy raises the concern, however, that in the most dramatic cases, the institution will have only illiquid assets left to sell, thus triggering large losses. An alternative strategy is to sell illiquid assets first, keeping a "cushion" of cash and liquid assets for "rainy days." Such a strategy, while increasing expected transaction costs, significantly decreases tail losses and, especially, the probability of insolvency. In light of our results, it seems wise for financial institutions to carefully examine their strategies for liquidation during periods of severe stress.
Our analysis has assumed that a given target capital ratio (8% in our case) will be maintained so long as it is possible to do so. Relaxation of this target ratio would presumably increase the probability of insolvency, while reducing expected transactions costs. Optimal liquidation strategies, for given risk-reward objectives, remain an interesting subject for future research.
Appendix
For the most-liquid-asset-first liquidation strategy, the recipe for liquidation is as follows.
If
then the firm's cash holdings are sufficient to meet the capital requirement. In this case, the firm's cash is reduced by λ 0,t so as to satisfy the capital requirement. Solving,
By assumption, none of the liquid or illiquid asset holdings are to be sold in this case. That is, λ 1,t = λ 2,t = 0.
2. Whenever
the α 0,t units of cash available are not sufficient to meet the capital requirement. Some of the liquid asset is therefore liquidated. If
then the current holdings of the liquid asset and cash together are sufficient to meet the capital requirement. In this case, cash is reduced first. That is, λ 0,t = α 0,t . The number of units of the liquid asset to be sold is based on the bid price, S 1,t (1 − X 1,t ). Thus,
Since none of the illiquid assets must be sold in this case, we have λ 2,t = 0.
3. Finally, if
then current holdings of cash and liquid asset are not sufficient to meet the regulatory capital requirement, and some of the illiquid asset holdings must be sold as well. In this case, all cash and liquid asset positions are liquidated (λ 0,t = α 0,t and λ 1,t = α 1,t ), and we find that
If λ 2 = α 2 , then the firm is effectively insolvent. Table 9 : 99%-Value at Risk, expected tail loss and probability of insolvency in the high-volatility case for the "cash-last" liquidation strategy. 
